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The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of general aviation (GA) airplane accidents and accident rates on the basis of
aircraft certification to determine whether or not differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents. In addition, the
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to determine whether there were differences in the
qualitative data for the different certification categories. The certification categories examined were: Federal Aviation Regulations Part 23
(Part 23), Civil Air Regulations 3 (CAR 3), Light Sport Aircraft (LSA), and Experimental-Amateur Built (E-AB). The accident causes
examined were those classified as: Loss of Control (LOC), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), Engine Failure, and Structural Failure.
Airworthiness certification categories represent a wide diversity of government oversight. Part 23 rules have evolved from the initial set of
simpler design standards and have progressed into a comprehensive and strict set of rules to address the safety issues of the more complex
airplanes within the category. E-AB airplanes have the least amount of government oversight and are the fastest-growing segment. The
LSA category is a more recent certification category that utilizes consensus standards in the approval process. CAR 3 airplanes were
designed and manufactured under simpler rules, but modifying these airplanes has become lengthy and expensive.
The study was conducted using a mixed-methods methodology. A Chi-Square test was used for a quantitative analysis of the accident
frequency among aircraft certification categories. Accident rate analysis of the accidents among aircraft certification categories involved an
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analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) test. The qualitative component involved the use of text mining techniques for the analysis of the
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports.
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the number of accidents among the different certification categories
when either CFIT or Structural Failure was listed as cause. However, there was a significant difference in the frequency of accidents with
regard to LOC and Engine Failure accidents. The results of the ANCOVA test indicated that there was no significant difference in the
accident rate with regard to LOC, CFIT, or Structural Failure accidents. There was, however, a significant difference in Engine Failure
accidents between E-AB and the other categories.
The text mining analysis of the narrative causes of LOC accidents indicated that only the CAR 3 category airplanes had clusters of words
associated with visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions. CAR 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to the
1960s, and in most cases have not been retrofitted to take advantage of newer technologies that could help prevent LOC accidents.
The study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules do not have a statistically significant effect on aircraft accidents except for LOC and
Engine Failure. According to the literature, government oversight could have become an obstacle in the implementation of safety-
enhancing equipment that could reduce LOC accidents. Oversight should focus on ensuring that E-AB aircraft owners perform a functional
test that could prevent some of the Engine Failure accidents.
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Introduction
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to ensure
the airworthiness of aircraft by requiring manufacturers of
aircraft and aircraft components to comply with approved
aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational
limitations. The main objective of aircraft certification
and continued airworthiness requirements is to increase the
reliability of safety critical systems (Committee on Aircraft
Certification Safety Management, 1998). While strict
certification requirements represent high standards for
aircraft manufacturers, in the last three decades new general
aviation (GA) aircraft certification costs have increased, the
number of GA aircraft produced has decreased and there
have been no accompanying substantial changes in
operational safety or accident rates (Bowles, 2010).
Background
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
that govern today’s aircraft are found in Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) (FAA, 2013).
Airworthiness and certification standards for airplanes in the
normal, utility, and aerobatic categories with a maximum
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less are
contained within 14 CFR Part 23 (Part 23) regulations
(FAA, 2013). Part 23 also includes multiengine airplanes in
the commuter category with a maximum certificated takeoff
weight of 19,000 pounds or less and a seating configuration,
excluding pilot seats, of 19 or less.
Since the 1980s, the regulatory scope of Part 23 has been
shifted to address more complex aircraft, placing an
excessive burden on the certification of simpler aircraft
(FAA, 2009). In 2009, the FAA began a Part 23
Certification Process Study (CPS) to assess the adequacy
of the current certification and airworthiness standards
processes (FAA, 2009). Following the recommendations of
the CPS in August 2011, the FAA created a Part 23 Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) (FAA, 2011b). The ARC
was tasked with completely restructuring Part 23 and
subdividing the category into tiers based on airplane
performance and complexity, as opposed to the existing
weight and propulsion classifications, thereby allowing the
FAA to target the required regulations and oversight
specifically to each tier as necessary (FAA, 2009, p. 15).
Tasks for the ARC also included a rewrite of the regulations
on a broad, general, and progressive level. The ARC
meetings were concluded in January of 2013; the
recommendations of the ARC were submitted to the FAA
in May of 2013 (Pompeo, 2013), and a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) is expected to be issued in December
of 2015 (FAA, 2011b). One of the recommendations from
the ARC is to develop a set of industry consensus standards
that will become the means of compliance for the
certification approval process of the new Part 23 regulations
(Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2012). As a
result of the ARC meetings, a new GA aircraft certification
chapter was created within an international consensus
standards organization, American Standards for Testing and
Materials (ASTM, n.d.), ASTM F44 (n.d.).
The use of industry consensus standards is consistent
with Public Law 104-113, also known as the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA), signed by President Clinton in March 1996.
The NTTAA encourages federal agencies in the U.S. to
utilize standards developed by voluntary consensus
standards bodies rather than government-unique standards,
wherever possible. It also includes provisions that
encourage federal agencies to partner with the private
sector in the development of these standards to help improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of government (National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).
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In the early 2000s, GA advocacy groups, such as the
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) and the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), became
concerned with rising certification costs and dwindling pilot
populations. As a result, these advocacy groups petitioned
the FAA to apply the NTTAA to an aviation case. In 2004,
the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of a new
aircraft category, Light Sport Aircraft (LSA), utilizing
consensus standards (Bowles, 2010). Two categories within
the LSA class were created: Special-Light Sport Aircraft (S-
LSA) and Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft (E-LSA).
ASTM was chosen for the implementation and management
of the LSA industry consensus standards. Early indicators
show that this new category has been a success; thus, the
propagation of consensus standards to more mainstream
uses has become an appealing option applicable to other
segments of aviation (FAA, 2009).
In the U.S., piston airplanes account for 67% of the total
civil aviation aircraft population, followed by experimental
airplanes at 11% (Figure 1). The number of piston airplanes
manufactured annually has been decreasing substantially
over the years. According to GAMA (2012), the U.S.
produced 15,594 piston airplanes in 1947; however, only
1,514 piston airplanes were produced in 2012. The
reduction in the number of aircraft produced represents a
decline of over 90% (see Figure 2).
The decrease in piston airplane production in the U.S.
from 1947 to 2012 can be attributed to many factors, such
as: (a) the redistribution of the market share with the
introduction of turbo-prop and jet airplanes, (b) the
evolution of the product liability law, (c) natural disasters,
(d) wars, (e) terrorist attacks, (f) economic downturns,
(g) increasing fuel prices, and (h) rising certification costs
(FAA, 2009; GAMA, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012).
Part 23-certified entry-level, two-seat and four-seat
airplanes are essential in pilot flight training. The price
of new entry-level airplanes has increased at a much higher
rate than standard inflation (see Figure 3). According to the
FAA (2009): “[a] consequence of the difficult regulatory
environment has been the high cost of certification and a
corresponding reduction of new entry-level products
within part 23” (FAA, 2009, p. 15). The few new certified
entry-level airplanes that are produced come at a very high
cost due to the lengthy and expensive certification
requirements. As a result, the existing flight training fleet
of airplanes is composed of aircraft produced decades ago
(GAMA, 2012). Retrofitting these old aircraft with new
technologies would involve a lengthy and expensive
recertification process, which inhibits many pilots from
taking advantage of new technologies. Due to the stringent
Part 23 regulatory requirements, these older aircraft
designs cannot accommodate the new safety technologies
that have become common, such as Ballistic Recovery
Parachutes (BRS) and air bags (FAA, 2009). Over the last
two decades, the U.S. active pilot population has been in
decline, with an average decline of 10,000 pilots per year
(GAMA, 2012).
A growing concern also exists about the number of active
pilots in the U.S. In 2012, the U.S. had 188,001 private
pilots, which represented over 100,000 fewer private pilots
than in 1992. In 1992, the private pilot population was at
288,078 (GAMA, 2012). In 2012, the number of sport pilots
increased 10.5% to 4,493 (see Figure 4), while the number
of private pilots decreased at an average rate of 10,000 pilots
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Figure 1. U.S. civil aviation aircraft population. Adapted from General
Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA (2012) and
Small Airplanes by Bowles (2012).
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As of 2013, there were 13 aircraft manufacturers of
Part 23-certified two- or four-seat piston aircraft in the U.S.
(GAMA, 2012); most of these Part 23 aircraft manufacturers
have been in operation for over 30 years. Since the creation
of the LSA category in 2004, 20 new U.S. manufacturers
of LSA aircraft have emerged (Johnson, n.d.). The pilot
population has increased by 4,066 pilots since 2004, when
the new LSA rules were implemented. This figure
represents an important contribution to an industry in
which the total active pilot population has been dwindling
over the last decade (GAMA, 2012). Part 23 has also been
the entry point for many new aircraft technologies,
including composite materials, satellite navigation and
approaches, integrated glass cockpits, synthetic vision, and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),
among others (Bowles, 2010).
The Experimental-Amateur Built (E-AB) category
constitutes the fastest-growing segment of the GA fleet in
the U.S. (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO],
2012). One of the main advantages for people to acquire an
E-AB, or convert a certified aircraft to the experimental
category, is that one can make modifications to an aircraft
without any coordination with the manufacturer
(McClellan, 2013). E-AB aircraft are defined by the FAA
as aircraft in which at least 51% of the aircraft was
fabricated and assembled by an individual or a group of
individuals and undertook the construction project solely for
their own education or recreation.
In 2011, there were approximately 33,000 E-AB aircraft
registered, a 10% increase from 2008, making E-AB aircraft
the fastest-growing segment of the GA fleet (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2012a). On the other
hand, the number of accidents involving E-AB aircraft had
increased between 1999 and 2011; E-AB aircraft accounted
for 14% of airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and
approximately 21% of fatal accidents. In 2012, the NTSB
completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft. Among other
findings, the NTSB concluded that the first 50 hours of
flight, known as the flight test period for E-AB airplanes, are
uniquely challenging for most pilots (NTSB, 2012b).
According to the NTSB study, power plant failures and
loss of control in flight are the most common E-AB aircraft
accident occurrences, and structural failures have not been
a common occurrence among E-AB aircraft. In comparison
with similar non-E-AB aircraft, a much higher proportion
of accidents involving E-AB aircraft occur early in the
operational life of the aircraft or shortly after being
purchased by a subsequent owner. The study also indicates
that the majority of E-AB aircraft are now built from






















Figure 3. Four-seat entry-level airplane comparison.
Note: The airplane base retail prices in the chart are for the following
airplanes in order from left to right: Cessna 170 in 1948, Aeronca Sedan in
1948, Cessna 172 in 1956, Maule M-4 in 1962, Mooney Master in 1963,
Beech Musketter in 1963, Piper Cherokee in 1964, Gruman Cheetah in
1972, Beech Sundowner in 1974, Grumman Tiger in 1975, Socata Tampico
in 1990, Cirrus SR-20 in 1999, Diamond Star in 2000, Cessna 172 in 2012,
and Cessna 182 in 2012. Standard inflationary rates against $5475 in 1948









































Figure 4. U.S. pilot population. Adapted from General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA (2012).
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original designs (NTSB, 2012b). According to the study, the
pilots of E-AB aircraft have similar, or higher, levels of total
aviation experience than pilots of non-E-AB aircraft
engaged in similar GA operations; however, pilots of
E-AB accident aircraft, on average, had considerably less
flight experience in the type of E-AB aircraft. FAR 91.319
(a)(2) prohibits the use of E-AB airplanes for hire, including
flight instruction and rental; therefore, finding suitable
E-AB aircraft and instructors available for training is
difficult and presents a barrier to pilots seeking transition
training (NTSB, 2012b).
The NTSB study also concluded that E-AB aircraft safety
is largely managed by the community of E-AB aircraft
builders, owners, and kit manufacturers rather than by FAA
regulatory requirements; however, the FAA regulations
mostly seek to ensure that the majority of work within the
E-AB aircraft building process is done by the builder
(NTSB, 2012b). Airworthiness certificates are granted to the
E-AB aircraft builder by the FAA based only on a review of
documentation and a one-time inspection of the aircraft after
it has been completed. Unlike other foreign civil aviation
authorities’ requirements, the FAA has no requirement
for preapproval of the project or in-process inspections of
materials and workmanship. According to the NTSB
(2012b), a large proportion of E-AB aircraft accidents
involving loss of engine power could be reduced by
requiring documentation of a functional test of the aircraft
fuel system as part of the initial airworthiness certification.
Main Causes of GA Accidents
According to the NTSB (2012a), in 2010, GA accidents
accounted for 96% of all aviation accidents, 97% of fatal
aviation accidents, and 96% of all fatalities for U.S. civil
aviation. In addition, GA accounted for 51% of the estimated
total flight time of all U.S. civil aviation in 2010. Figure 5
shows the total and fatal accidents for GA for the years from
2001 through 2010, including the experimental category.
These accidents do not include commercial aviation
operations, including Parts 121, 135, or 129 operations.
These figures also do not include air medical, sightseeing, or
air tour operations, since these types of accidents were
discussed separately in the NTSB report (2012a).
The NTSB (2012a) report indicates that the number
of GA accidents declined over the period of 2001 to 2010;
however, the number of fatal accidents has remained steady
over the same period of time. Fatal accidents account for
approximately 19% of total accidents in GA; this percentage
has also remained relatively steady, ranging from 17% to
20% between 2001 and 2010 (see Figure 5). The accident
rate for both fatal and nonfatal accidents also remained
relatively steady, as the number of hours flown have
decreased during the same period of time. Figure 6 shows
the estimated total flight hours for GA based on the GA
Survey, and Figure 7 shows the accident rate for GA. One of
the major limitations with GA activity data is that the
number of hours flown per year and other activity
information is obtained from the GA survey. The GA
survey collects voluntary information from aircraft owners
and operators (GAO, 2012). In order to maintain a more
accurate count of the number of active aircraft, the FAA
began requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew
aircraft registrations every three years, beginning in 2010.
GA encompasses a wide range of operations and aircraft,
from powered parachutes, gliders, and light sport aircraft to
turboprops and jets used for a variety of missions. The
majority of GA accidents in 2010 involved personal flying in
fixed-wing airplanes, which accounted for 64% (912) of the
total number of accidents; the second category of GA
accidents was flight instruction in fixed-wing airplanes, which
accounted for 10% (140) of the accidents (NTSB, 2012a).
In Stephens (2012), the FAA identified the top ten
leading causes of fatal GA accidents to be (see Figure 8):
1. Loss of control in flight;
2. Controlled flight into terrain;
3. System or component failure/power plant;


















































Figure 5. Total and fatal GA accidents. Adapted from Review of Aircraft Accident Data 2010 (NTSB, 2012a, p. 33).
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5. Unknown or undetermined;
6. Other;
7. Fuel related;
8. System component failure—non-power plant:
9. Midair collisions; and
10. Wind shear or thunderstorm.
According to the FAA (2011a), from 2010 to 2012, fatal
accidents from CFIT have been reduced by more than
50% compared to the previous three years. Fatal accidents
involving LOC in flight, during approach, and during
landing have decreased by approximately 20% to 25%.
Meanwhile, fatal accidents caused by bad weather have
decreased by nearly 40% in the past three years, and fatal
accidents occurring at night decreased by about 25%. The
FAA attributes these reductions in fatal accidents to the use
of technology such as Global Positioning System (GPS)
with moving maps and in-flight weather capabilities. New
technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic para-
chutes, data-link weather in the cockpit, Angle of Attack
(AOA) indicators, traffic alert systems, and terrain
avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities
if these technologies are allowed to be implemented in
certified airplanes. The FAA is making an effort to facilitate
the approval process of AOA indicators and seatbelts with
airbags in order to allow all GA aircraft to be eligible for the
installation of these devices (FAA, 2011a).
In a further effort to reduce GA accidents, the General
Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) was formed
in the mid-1990s and is currently renewing its accident
reduction efforts. The GAJSC is a government and industry
group that uses a data-driven, consensus-based approach to
analyze safety data to develop specific interventions that
will mitigate the root causes of accidents. The group
released recommendations to address LOC during
approach and landing (GAJSC, 2012). The report
addresses the current Part 23 certification problems and
emphasizes the importance of incorporating new technol-
ogies to prevent accidents. CFIT fatal accidents dropped
60% between 2001 and 2010; the GAJSC (2012) attributes
that improvement to the use of electronic information such
as GPS position on a moving map, real-time weather,
terrain awareness, and traffic awareness. These electronic
devices have made a considerable contribution in the
reduction of pilot workload. The GAJSC (2012) also
emphasizes that most of the safety-enhancing technology
that lowered the CFIT accident rate was in the form of
handheld equipment not installed in the airplane, such as
handheld GPS systems and tablets.
The GAJSC (2012) also recommended the use of
AOA indicators and autopilots to prevent LOC accidents;
however, these technologies, for the most part, must be
installed in the airplane and are not available in the form
of handheld equipment. The high cost of certification and
installation keeps these technologies out of small certified
airplanes. The report also states that the cost of installing an
existing AOA system on a certified airplane is almost ten
times higher than installing the same system on an
experimental airplane.
According to the GAJSC (2012), LOC accidents at
night and in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
would drop by 50% simply by installing autopilots in the
more than 100,000 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable
GA airplanes. Autopilots can be installed in experimental
airplanes for as low as $2,500; however, installing an
autopilot on a certified airplane could cost at least $10,000,
which represents between 10% and 50% of the average
value of a GA airplane. The GAJSC (2012) report also
recommended that the FAA apply a risk management
approach to analyze whether the current certification
regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety-
enhancing technology into the GA fleet.
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market could have
a beneficial effect on attracting new pilots, invigorating the
manufacturing industry, and facilitating the retrofit of an
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Figure 6. Estimated GA flight hours. Adapted from Review of Aircraft
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Figure 7. Total and fatal accident rates for GA. Adapted from Review of
Aircraft Accident Data 2010 by (NTSB, 2012a, p. 36).
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industry consensus standards for aircraft certification may
be an appealing alternative for the U.S. to maintain the
competitive edge in a globalized marketplace.
Methodology
The study focused on analyzing GA accidents involving
fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston for the
following reasons: (a) piston airplanes account for 67% of
the total civil aircraft population, (b) the number of piston
airplanes manufactured annually has been decreasing
substantially over the last ten years, (c) 64% of GA
accidents involved personal flying in fixed-wing airplanes,
(d) 78% of personal flying was conducted in fixed-wing,
single-engine piston airplanes, and (e) entry-level airplanes
have been identified by the FAA as being the most affected
by the increased difficulty and cost of certification.
The research concentrated on comparing airplane
accidents based on airworthiness certification. The air-
worthiness categories utilized in the study were Part 23,
CAR 3, S-LSA, ELSA, and E-AB. The time period
selected for the accident occurrences was between January
1, 2004 and December 31, 2011 so as to include the LSA







The study employed a mixed-methods analysis that used
an explanatory sequential design consisting of two phases
(Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). The first phase was
composed of the collection and analysis of quantitative
data to address the study’s hypotheses. The second phase
consisted of the analysis of the qualitative data from the
narrative section of the accident investigation reports
utilizing text mining techniques.
Design and Procedures
The primary purpose of aircraft certification is to maximize
safety by minimizing the number of accidents. Accidents
involving the top three causes of accidents in GA (LOC,
CFIT, and Engine Failure) were analyzed and compared
based on aircraft airworthiness certification basis.
In addition, accidents due to Structural Failure were also
analyzed, as this is one of the failures or malfunctions that
aircraft certification is designed to prevent.
The research focused on the overarching hypothesis
that there is no significant difference in the frequency of
accidents or in the accident rate among airplanes certified
under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, ELSA, or E-AB categories in
which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was
listed as a cause in the period between January 1, 2004 and
December 31, 2011.
The quantitative portion of the study consisted of two
parts. In the first part, a Chi-Square statistical test was
conducted to compare the frequencies of accidents among
airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or
Figure 8. Top ten causes of GA fatal accidents. Adapted from Evolving GA to a Data-Driven and Proactive Process (Stephens, 2012).
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E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural
Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. If the Chi-
Square test value had a probability of less than .05 ( pv.05),
the null hypothesis would be rejected. In the second part, an
ANCOVA statistical test was utilized to compare the
accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR
3, SLSA/ELSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004
to 2011. If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a
probability of less than .05 ( pv.05), then the null
hypothesis would be rejected.
For the ANCOVA statistical test, the dependent variable
used was accident rate. The accident rate was calculated by
dividing the number of accidents per year for each of the
aircraft airworthiness categories by the number of hours
flown per year for each category; these data were obtained
from the GA activity survey, shown in Table 3 (GAMA,
2012). The fixed factor or independent variable used was
airworthiness certification basis. In order to account for pilot
experience, design stage of the airplane, and age of the
airplane, the number of hours on the airplane’s airframe and
the number of hours of total flight time of the pilot were
used as covariates. Covariates are not part of the dependent
or independent variables, but have the potential to have an
influence on the dependent variable (Field, 2009).
Following the quantitative analysis, the qualitative
portion of the study consisted of the analysis of the
narrative cause section of the NTSB reports for accidents in
which LOC was listed as a cause. LOC accidents are of
special interest because they are the main cause of GA
accidents (Stephens, 2012). LOC is of particular interest to
the FAA as it relates to aircraft certification because the
GAJSC (2012) recommended the use of AOA indicators
and autopilots to prevent LOC accidents; however, these
technologies, for the most part, must be installed in the
airplane and are not available in the form of handheld
equipment. The high cost of certification and installation
deters airplane owners and operators from incorporating
these technologies in small GA airplanes. The GAJSC
(2012) also stated that the cost of installing an existing AOA
system on a certified airplane is almost ten times higher than
installing the same system on an experimental airplane.
Text mining techniques were used to analyze the
qualitative portion of the NTSB accident reports, more
specifically the narrative cause section. These narratives
consisted of a few sentences or a few paragraphs of text,
depending on the complexity and nature of the accident. The
information in the narrative cause section can vary within the
database as (a) different reporters may include various levels
of detail, and (b) different causes and factors leading to the
accident are confined within the narrative. Text mining can
help identify sets of related words from the narrative cause
portion of the report; it can also identify clusters of similar
circumstances, possible patterns, and relationships among
accidents (Nisbet, Elder, & Miner, 2009).
Population and Sample
The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-wing,
single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum
certificated takeoff weights of less than 12,500 pounds. The
sample consisted of accidents of single-engine piston, fixed-
wing airplanes with maximum certified takeoff weights
of less than 12,500 pounds between January 1, 2004 and
December 31, 2011. The airworthiness certification
categories used for the study were: (a) standard category,
which also includes normal, utility, and aerobatic; (b) LSA;
and (c) amateur-built airplanes within the experimental
category. The airworthiness categories excluded from the
sample were limited, restricted, special flight, provisional,
transport, and unknown. The start of the time period selected
was based on the creation of the LSA category in 2004; the
end of the time period selected was based on the availability
of NTSB accident reports with a probable cause.
Sources of the Data
The sources of data to obtain the airplane accident information
were: (a) a public accessible NTSB accident database
available online in Microsoft AccessH format, and (b) the
FAA type certificate database. The FAA type certificate
database was used to determine the aircraft certification basis.
Hypothesis Testing
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA
airplane accidents and accident rates on the basis of aircraft
certification to determine whether or not differences in aircraft
certification rules had an influence on accidents. The
certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, LSA,
and E-AB. The accident causes examined were those listed as:
LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, and Structural Failure in the time
period between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2011.
The hypotheses were:
H01. There is no significant difference in the frequency
of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23,
CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from
2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less
than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would be
rejected.
H02. There is no significant difference in the frequency
of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23,
CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from
2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less
than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would be
rejected.
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H03. There is no significant difference in the frequency
of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23,
CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a
cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than
.05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
H04. There is no significant difference in the frequency
of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23,
CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a
cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than
.05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
H05. There is no significant difference in the accident
rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004
to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability
of less than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would
be rejected.
H06. There is no significant difference in the accident
rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-
LSA/E-LSA, or E-ABcategorieswith regard to accidents
in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability
of less than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would
be rejected.
H07. There is no significant difference in the accident
rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-
LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a
cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability
of less than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would
be rejected.
H08. There is no significant difference in the accident
rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a
cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability
of less than .05 ( pv.05), then the null hypothesis would
be rejected.
Qualitative Data
The qualitative data for the study was extracted from the
narrative cause section of the NTSB accident investigation
reports. The qualitative results helped explain the initial
quantitative results (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Text
mining techniques were utilized to help analyze the
qualitative portion of the NTSB accident reports.
The text mining function of the STATISTICA Data
Mining Software was utilized to analyze the dataset. This
text mining function aids in the identification of the main
words encountered in the document, along with their
frequency. A variety of plots are available, including a scree
plot and a scatter plot. The scree plot indicates the different
dimensions and the percentage of the total variance. The
elbow or point of inflection of the scree plot indicates the
words that appear most frequently. The scatter plot allows
for the identification of word groups or clusters.
Results
Table 1 shows the frequency of accidents by cause and
certification basis for all accidents that met the criteria of
the study.
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. Some
information, such as the number of hours on the airframe,
was missing for many NTSB accident reports; however, this
variable was not one of the critical variables utilized in the
study. Therefore, the average of the hours on the airframe
per year was calculated with the available data and utilized
as a covariate.
Table 3 provides information about the number of hours
on the airframe and the pilot total flight time by certification
category. S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB airplanes are, on
average, newer than Part 23 and CAR 3 airplanes. The
average pilot flight times did not differ substantially.
As expected, the CAR 3 airplanes’ average number of hours
on the airframe was higher than the other categories because
they are the oldest airplanes.
Table 4 provides the frequency and type of pilot
certificate, as well as whether or not there was an instructor
on board. As Table 4 shows, 54% of the pilots in the sample
Table 1




CAR 3 Part 23 E-AB S-LSA E-LSA Total/Cause
LOC 618 196 266 41 34 1,155
CFIT 405 76 75 6 1 563
Eng. Fail. 587 127 216 15 28 973
Str.Fail. 176 51 91 11 3 332
Total 1,786 450 648 73 66 3,023
Other 2,258 588 467 78 41 3,432
Total/ Cert.
Basis
4,044 1,038 1,115 151 107 6,455
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had at least a private pilot certificate, 26% had a commercial
certificate, and 10% had an ATP. Only 0.2%, or 5 accidents,
had unknown or missing information about the pilot
certificate. An instructor was on board in 22% of the sample
accidents.
The frequency of accidents by cause is displayed in
Figure 9. Airplanes certified under CAR 3 rules account for
53.5%, or 618, of the accidents in which LOC was listed as a
cause between the period of January 1, 2004 and December
31, 2011. Airplanes certified under CAR 3 rules also account
for 62.65% of the total accidents within the same period.
The general trend of the rate of accidents by certification
basis for Part 23/CAR 3 certified airplanes has remained
nearly constant, as shown in Figure 10. The large spike in
the accident rate for LSA can be attributed to the start of the
category in 2004; production of LSA airplanes began in
2005 with only three accidents and 9,000 hours flown that
year in the LSA category.
Table 5 shows the frequency of accidents, number of
active aircraft, hours flown, and accident rate by certification
basis. Figure 11 shows the accident rate by accident cause and
certification basis. The accident rate for the LSA and E-AB
categories for accidents inwhich LOCwas listed as a cause is
higher than for Part 23 category airplanes, even though Part
23 airplanes account for 814 accidents in which LOC was
listed as a cause and LSA airplanes were only involved in 75
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause between the
years of 2004 and 2011. The higher accident rate for LSA
airplanes is attributed to the much lower number of estimated
hours flown during the same period. The accident rates for
Part 23 and LSA airplanes in which CFIT was listed as a
cause are nearly equal.
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
A total of 6,455 accidents met the initial airworthiness
certification criteria of this study. The total number of
accidents involving LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or
Structural Failure was 3,023 (see Table 4). These accidents
were utilized for the analyses to address the hypotheses. The
sample consisted of: 1,155 LOC accidents, 563 CFIT
accidents, 973 Engine Failure accidents, and 332 Structural
Failure accidents. The number of accidents by certification
category were: 1,786 accidents for CAR 3, 450 accidents for
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Certificated Weight Airframe Hours Pilot Hours No. of Seats
Valid 3,023 2,571 2,951 2,994
Missing 0 452 72 29
Mean 2,271.98 3,260.46 2,929.62 3.23
Median 2,300.00 2,740.00 961.00 4.00
Mode 2,300 0 1,000 4
SD 935.45 3,572.64 5,336.42 1.40
Skewness 1.05 6.72 3.53 .51
Kurtosis 6.23 133.42 15.20 {.29
Min 388 0 0 1
25 Percentile 1,600.00 601.00 334.00 2.00
50 Percentile 2,300.00 2,740.00 961.00 4.00
75 Percentile 2,900.00 4,598.00 2800.00 4.00
Max. 12,000 89,118 55,000 11
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Airframe Hours and Pilot Hours by Aircraft
Certification Categories
Cert. Basis Covariate Valid Min Max Mean SD
CAR 3 Airframe Hours 1,541 25 89,118 3,884.00 3,758.65
Pilot Hours 1,749 0 55,000 3,041.09 5,601.17
PART 23 Airframe Hours 408 3 12,616 2,272.62 2,089.72
Pilot Hours 445 0 49,800 2,535.31 4,624.89
E-AB Airframe Hours 509 0 19,611 412.31 1,066.85
Pilot Hours 624 0 33,000 2,840.22 4,853.78
E-LSA Airframe Hours 48 0 12,691 495.08 1,808.81
Pilot Hours 61 10 31,270 3,857.84 7,465.82
S-LSA Airframe Hours 64 0 3,542 312.28 533.57
Pilot Hours 71 8 25,000 2,652.01 4,621.59
Table 4
Frequency of Pilot Certificate Type and Instructor On-board











Instructor on-board Frequency Percent
No 2,359 78
Yes 664 22
C. L. Anderson / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 41
Part 23, 648 accidents for E-AB, 73 accidents for S-LSA,
and 66 accidents for E-LSA.
Hypothesis Testing
The evaluation of eight hypotheses under investigation
was conducted utilizing two main statistical methods: Chi-
Square test and ANCOVA. Discussion of the statistical
significance of the hypotheses follows.
To address hypotheses one through four, Chi-Square tests
were performed to determine whether the different causes of
accidents were distributed differently across certification
basis categories; therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is
no significant difference in the frequency of accidents
among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-
LSA/ELSA or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure,
or Structural Failure was listed as a cause between the years
of 2004 and 2011. Since only the accident frequencies were
utilized for the Chi-Square test, the amount of activity, or
the number of active airplanes for each category, was not
taken into account. The Chi-Square test compares the
observed and expected frequencies; the test determines if
the expected values differ significantly from the observed
values. The standardized residuals show the difference
between the expected frequencies and the observed
frequencies. The individual standardized residuals provide
very useful information about the contribution of each of the
expected and observed frequencies to the overall association
that the Chi-Square statistic measures (Field, 2009).
H01. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the frequency of accidents
among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3,
SLSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. The Chi-
Square test indicated that there was a significant
difference in the frequency of accidents in which LOC
was listed as a cause. The post-hoc analysis indicated that
the significant differencewas among Part 23, CAR3, and
E-AB categories; however, it indicated no significant
difference in the frequency of accidents among the
SLSA/ELSA category for LOC accidents (see Appendix
TableC.1). The standardized residuals also indicated that
the CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories had significant
difference in frequencies; the Part 23 and E-AB
categories did not have any significant residuals.
H02. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the frequency of accidents
among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3,
SLSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause. The Chi-
Square test indicated that there was no significant
difference in the frequency of accidents in which CFIT
was listed as a cause.
H03. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the frequency of accidents
among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3,
SLSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was a
significant difference in the frequency of accidents in
which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.
H04. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the frequency of accidents
among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3,
SLSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a
cause. The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no
significant difference in the frequency of accidents in
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Figure 10. Accident rate by year and certification basis for study sample.
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per
100,000 hours.
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To address hypotheses five through eight, a series of
one-way factorial ANCOVA tests with covariates
(ANCOVAs) was performed to determine whether or
not there is a significant difference in the accident rate
among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3,
SLSA/ELSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause after
controlling for pilot flight time and number of hours on
the aircraft’s airframe. Therefore, the null hypotheses
were: there is no significant difference in the accident
rate among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3,
S-LSA/ELSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause.
The CAR 3 and Part 23 categories were combined into
one group and the SLSA and ELSA categories were
combined into another group for this analysis, as the
total hours per year used to calculate the accident rate
were only available for the combined categories.
H05. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the accident rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/ELSA,
or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which LOC was
listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test indicated that there
was no significant difference in the accident rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA or
E-AB, with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed
as a cause.
H06. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the accident rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA,
or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which CFIT was
listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test indicated that there
was no significant difference in the accidents rate
among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3,
SLSA/ELSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in
which CFIT was listed as a cause.
H07. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the accident rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA,
or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which Engine
Failure was listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test
indicated that there was a significant difference in the
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part
23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA, or E-AB, with regard to
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.
There was also a significant interaction between the
certification basis and the effects of the number of total
flight time of the pilot; there was no significant
interaction between certification basis and the number
of hours on the airplane’s airframe. The pair-wise
Table 5
Frequency of Accidents, Active Airplanes, Hours Flown, and Accident Rate by Cause and Certification Basis for 2004–2011
Accident Cause Cert. Basis No. accidents Hours Flown No. Active Airplanes Accident Rate
LOC PART 23/CAR 3 814 106,850,031 149,711 7.62E-06
LSA 75 1,581,539 4,545 4.74E-05
E-AB 266 7,392,719 21,106 3.60E-05
CFIT PART 23/CAR 3 481 106,850,031 149,711 4.50E-06
LSA 7 1,581,539 4,545 4.43E-06
E-AB 75 7,392,719 21,106 1.01E-05
Engine Failure PART 23/CAR 3 714 106,850,031 149,711 6.68E-06
LSA 43 1,581,539 4,545 2.72E-05
E-AB 187 7,392,719 21,106 2.53E-05
Structural Failure PART 23/CAR 3 227 106,850,031 149,711 2.12E-06
LSA 14 1,581,539 4,545 8.85E-06
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Figure 11. Accident rate by accident cause and certification basis.
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per 100,000 hours.
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post-hoc analysis indicated that there were significant
differences between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes,
and between E-AB and SLSA/ELSA airplanes;
however, there was not a significant difference between
Part 23/CAR 3 and SLSA/ELSA airplanes with regards
to the means of the accident rates in which Engine
Failure was listed as a cause.
H08. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no
significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA, or E-AB,
with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was
listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test indicated that there
was no significant difference in the accident rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/ELSA, or
E-AB,with regard to accidents inwhich Structural Failure
was listed as a cause.
Text Mining
Text mining was used to analyze the narrative causes of
accident reports. Only the narrative causes of accidents in
which LOC was listed as a cause were analyzed. The first
analysis of accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause for
all aircraft certification categories indicated three main
groups of words or clusters. The first cluster was associated
with LOC during takeoffs and landings, the second cluster
was associated with maneuvering flight, and the third
cluster was associated with low visibility, degraded weather
conditions, and VFR flight into IMC. Accidents involving
the Part 23 category had a cluster of words associated with
spatial disorientation and instrument flight. The CAR 3
category had a cluster associated with low visibility, poor
weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC
conditions. The E-AB and LSA airplanes did not have
any clusters of words associated with low visibility, poor
weather conditions, or VFR flight into IMC.
Conclusions
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft
certification rules do not have a statistically significant
effect on the frequency of CFIT accidents or the accident
rate. Based on the literature, CFIT fatal accidents dropped
60% between 2001 and 2010 (GAJSC, 2012). This decrease
in the number of CFIT accidents is attributed largely to
electronic devices, mainly in the form of handheld
equipment, that have made a considerable contribution in
the reduction of pilot workload (GAJSC, 2012).
The results of the study indicate that GA aircraft
certification rules have a statistically significant effect on
the frequency of LOC accidents, but not on the accident
rate. LOC accounted for 1,155 accidents, an accident rate of
0.99 per 100,000 hours flown, or 18% of all the accidents
between 2004 and 2011, and is the number one cause of
accidents in GA. These results are consistent with previous
studies and support the need to focus on LOC prevention for
GA to reduce the overall frequency of GA accidents and the
accident rate (GAJSC, 2012; GAO, 2012; NTSB, 2012b).
Airplanes certified under CAR 3 rules accounted for 53.5%,
or 618 of the accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause,
and also accounted for 62.65% of the total accidents
between 2004 and 2011.
The text mining analysis of the qualitative portion of the
accident reports showed that CAR 3 airplanes, unlike the
other categories, were involved in LOC accidents associated
with low visibility, poor weather conditions, night, and VFR
flight into IMC conditions. CAR 3 airplanes were designed
and manufactured prior to the 1960s and are the oldest
airplanes of the GA fleet. CAR 3 airplanes, in most cases,
have not been retrofitted to take advantage of the newer
technologies that could possibly aid in the prevention of
LOC accidents. According to the literature, LOC accidents
at night and in IMC would drop by 50% simply by installing
autopilots in the more than 100,000 IFR-capable GA
airplanes (GAJSC, 2012).
The results of the study indicate that GA aircraft
certification rules have a statistically significant effect on
the frequency of Engine Failure accidents and the accident
rate. The results of the study also indicate that there was a
significant difference in the accident rate of Engine Failure
accidents between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3, and between
E-AB and S-LSA/E LSA airplanes; however, there was not
a significant difference between airplanes certified under
S-LSA/E-LSA or Part 23/CAR 3. As found in the literature,
many of the Engine Failure accidents in the E-AB category
occur during the first few hours of operation of a newly built
aircraft or shortly after being purchased by a new owner; the
majority of these accidents are due to design and installation
problems with the engine and fuel systems (NTSB, 2012b).
The majority of E-AB airplanes are built from commercially
available kits rather than from plans or original designs
(NTSB, 2012b). As explained in the literature, a primary
focus of the FAA regulations that oversee the E-AB
building process seeks to ensure that the majority of the
construction of the airplane is performed by the builder
(NTSB, 2012b). Airworthiness certificates are granted to the
builder of an E-AB aircraft by the FAA based on the review
of the paperwork and a one-time inspection of the airplane
once the airplane has been completed (NTSB, 2012b).
A functional test of the airplane’s fuel system is required by
civil aviation authorities in other countries, but it is not
required by the FAA (NTSB, 2012b).
The results of this study indicate that the average pilot
flight times did not differ substantially among the different
certification categories; this result is supported by the
literature. On the other hand, the literature also indicates that
pilots of E-AB accident aircraft, on average, had
considerably less flight experience in the make and model
of E-AB airplanes (NTSB, 2012b). E-AB aircraft are not
allowed to be operated for compensation or hire, which
includes flight instruction; therefore, the difficulty of
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finding suitable E-AB aircraft and instructors available for
training presents a barrier to pilots seeking transition
training (NTSB, 2012b).
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft
certification rules do not have a statistically significant
effect on the frequency of Structural Failure accidents or the
accident rate. Structural Failure is one of the failures or
malfunctions that aircraft certification is designed to
prevent. Structural Failure is not one of the leading causes
of accidents in GA, and based on the results of this study,
Structural Failure accidents accounted for 332 accidents, an
accident rate of 0.30 per 100,000 hours flown, or 5% of all
the accidents between 2004 and 2011. Therefore, it appears
that, regardless of the amount of government oversight with
regards to certification, the FAA has been able to minimize
the amount of accidents due to Structural Failure.
In summary, GA aircraft certification rules do not have a
statistically significant effect on aircraft accidents except on
the frequency of LOC accidents, and on the frequency and
accident rate of Engine Failure accidents. With respect to
LOC accidents, it appears that government oversight could
have become an obstacle in the implementation and
installation of new safety enhancing equipment into old
aircraft that could possibly reduce the number of LOC
accidents. With respect to Engine Failure accidents, aircraft
certification oversight within the E-AB category is
precluding E-AB aircraft owners from being able to receive
flight instruction and becoming proficient in specific E-AB
models, and also from allowing professional organizations
to complete and flight test their E-AB airplanes. On the
other hand, government oversight should focus on ensuring
that E-AB aircraft owners perform a functional test before
obtaining an airworthiness certificate. A functional test
could prevent some of the Engine Failure accidents that
occur in the first few hours of operation of E-AB airplanes.
Recommendations
The results of this study indicate that there is a significant
difference in the frequency of accidents and the accident rate
among E-AB and the other two major categories: (a)
Part23/CAR 3, and (b) SLSA/E-LSA for accidents in which
Engine Failure was listed as a cause. Based on the literature
and the results of this study, the FAA’s oversight emphasis
on E-AB aircraft should be shifted to allow E-AB aircraft to
be completed and flight tested by professional organiz-
ations, thereby reducing some of the accidents due to
installation and flight test errors. The FAA should also
consider allowing transition flight training in E-AB aircraft,
thereby increasing pilot proficiency in specific types of E-
AB airplanes. In addition, to reduce Engine Failure
accidents in E-AB aircraft, the FAA should require a
functional test of the airplane’s systems, including the fuel
system, before the airworthiness certificate is issued to the
builder (NTSB, 2012b).
To reduce the accident rate and the frequency of LOC
accidents in GA, it is important to focus on the airplanes
certified under CAR 3 rules for three reasons: (a) CAR 3
airplanes consist of the oldest airplanes of the GA fleet; (b)
CAR 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to
the 1960s, and in most cases, have not been retrofitted to
take advantage of the newer technologies; and (c) the text
mining analysis showed that CAR 3 airplanes were involved
in LOC accidents associated with poor weather conditions
and VFR flight into IMC conditions. The use of AOA
indicators and autopilots to prevent LOC accidents should
be assessed. The FAA should facilitate the retrofit of the
legacy fleet with safety-enhancing technology, if this
technology proves to be helpful in the prevention of LOC
accidents.
As indicated by the text mining analysis of the narrative
cause of the accident reports, the aircraft within each category
are operated differently and have various needs; therefore, to
reduce the number of LOC accidents in GA, each aircraft
certification category needs to be addressed differently. The
words found within each of the text mining clusters have
indicated the emphasis areas where additional training,
technology, or awareness should be placed to reduce LOC
accidents. As seen in Table 3, the CAR 3 airplanes have, on
average, the largest number of hours on the airframe;
however, the average pilot flight times do not differ
substantially among any of the categories. As suggested in
the literature, retrofitting these older airplanes to take
advantage of new technologies might help in the reduction of
LOC accidents. Based on the clusters of words revealed in the
text mining analysis, the areas of emphasis to reduce LOC
accidents among CAR 3 airplanes should be: (a) avoiding
VFR flight into IMC, (b) aeronautical decision making, (c)
preflight planning, and (d) traffic pattern work, especially
during instructional flights. To reduce LOC accidents among
Part 23 airplanes, the areas of emphasis should be: (a) traffic
pattern work, especially during instructional flights, and (b)
spatial disorientation in instrument conditions. To reduce
LOC accidents among the E-AB airplanes, the areas of
emphasis should be: (a) takeoff, (b) landings, (c) maneuver-
ing flight, and (d) low altitude maneuvering. To reduce LOC
accidents among the LSA airplanes, the areas of emphasis
should include: (a) traffic pattern work, especially during
instructional flights, and (b) maneuvering flight. Advocacy
groups like Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) and
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) could
be approached to disseminate information and conduct
specialized training for each particular category, such as
E-AB and LSA.
The adoption of consensus standards for GA aircraft
certification could be an appealing alternative. Applying
consensus standards has the potential to simplify the retrofit of
the legacy fleet of GA airplanes to encourage the installation
of safety enhancements in a timely and economically viable
way. As supported by the literature, a risk management
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approach should be taken to analyze whether the current
certification regulations are actually an obstacle in installing
safety enhancing technology into the GA fleet (GAJSC,
2012). Installing autopilots andAOA indicators on a certified
airplane could cost between five to ten times more than
installing these devices on an experimental airplane, which
could represent between 10%and50%of the average value of
a GA airplane (GAJSC, 2012). The risks and benefits of
installing autopilots and AOA indicators in older aircraft
without a stringent, expensive, and time-consuming certifica-
tion process should be assessed.
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Appendix
Definition of Terms
14 CFR Part 23 Part 23 within Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations contains airworthiness and
certification standards for airplanes in the
normal, utility, and aerobatic categories, with
a maximum certificated takeoff weight of
12,500 pounds or less (FAA, 2012).
Aircraft Device that is used or intended to be used for
flight in the air, including airplanes,
helicopters, and gliders, among others (FAA,
2012).
Airplane Engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft, heavier-
than-air that are supported in flight by the




The certification basis identifies the
applicable standards to which the applicant
must show compliance. It also includes the
need for special conditions, exemptions, and
equivalent safety findings, if any. An issues
list should be included to highlight those
special requirements needing resolution and
other areas that may be significant, even
though they may not warrant a special
condition, exemption, or equivalent safety
finding (Aerospace Industries Association
[AIA], GAMA & FAA, 2004).
Entry-level
Airplane
In the context of this study, entry-level
aircraft or airplane means an aircraft that one




All non-military aviation operations other
than scheduled air services and air transport
for remuneration or hire. These operations
include flight instruction, business, personal,




“[T]he state of performing a given skill with
expert correctness.” (Soaring Safety
Foundation, n.d., para. 2)
List of Acronyms
14 CFR Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
AC Advisory Circular
ACO Aircraft Certification Office
ACPRR/ARC Aircraft Certification Process Review and
Reform/Aviation Rulemaking Committee
AD Airworthiness Directive
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast
AIA Aerospace Industries Association
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics
AIR Aircraft Certification Service
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
AOA Angle of Attack
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee
ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials
ASTM F44 American Society of Testing and Materials
Chapter F44
BRS Ballistic Recovery Parachutes
CACSM Committee on Aircraft Certification Safety
Management
CAR Civil Air Regulation
CAR 3 Civil Air Regulation 3
CFI Certified Flight Instructor
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPS Certification Process Study
DER Designated Engineering Representative
DoD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
EAA Experimental Aircraft Association
E-AB Experimental-Amateur Built
EAC Eclipse Aviation Corporation
EIA/GEIA Electronic Industries Alliance/Government
Electronics and Information Technology
Association
E-LSA Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FAWG Future of Aerospace Working Group
GA General Aviation
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association
GAO Government Accountability Office
GARA General Aviation Revitalization Act
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPS Global Positioning System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICAT International Center for Air Transportation
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IPC Institute for Printed Circuits
ISO International Organization for
Standardization
LOC Loss of Control
LSA Light Sport Aircraft
LTSP Light-Sport Special Category (NTSB
database variable name)
MIDO Manufacturing Inspection District Office
Mil-specs Military-specifications
MSR Military Specifications Reform
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTTAA National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
ODA Organization Delegation Authorization
OMB Office of Management and Budget
Part 23 14 CFR Part 23
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Part 25 14 CFR Part 25
PMA Parts Manufacturing Approval
SAE Society of Aerospace Engineers
SFAR Special Federal Airworthiness Regulation
S-LSA Special-Light Sport Aircraft
SPE Special Category Experimental (NTSB
database variable name)
SPL Special Category Limited (NTSB database
variable name)
SPR Special Category Restricted (NTSB database
variable name)
SPS Special Flight (NTSB database variable
name)
SPSS Statistical Product and Service Solutions
previously Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences
SPV Special Provisional
SSF Soaring Safety Foundation
STA Standard Category Aerobatic (NTSB
database variable name)
STC Supplemental Type Certificates
STN Standard Category Normal (NTSB database
variable name)
STT Special Transport (NTSB database variable
name)
STU Standard Category Utility (NTSB database
variable name)
TSOA Technical Standard Order Authorization
UNK Unknown (NTSB database variable name)
USITC United States International Trade
Commission
VFR Visual Flight Rules
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